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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

CRYSTAL LIME AND CEMENT
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

8948

GOLDEN W. ROBBINS and HARRIET J. K. ROBBINS, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

DEFENDANTS' AND RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

PREFACE
The only question to be determined by this appeal
is, did the rrrial Court abuse its discretion in dismissing
the action under Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondents do not agree with Appellant's statement of facts, and thereforP, will make their own statement of fact.

1
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ABBREVIATED STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant commenced action September 9, 1946, to
quiet title. The Lower Court quieted title in the Appellant without reimbursement.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court in
1949. (R. 2-7) Case was reversed. Appellate court held
title could not be quieted unless the Appellant reimbursed Respondents.
After remand of the case to District Court, Judge
Baker determined the amount of reimbursement, but no
formal written Judgment prepared. (R. 18 and 19)
Appellant filed Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice (R. 21), heard before Judge Jeppson and denied
(R. 22), from which an intermediate appeal was taken
and denied. (Supreme Court No. 8113)
Appellants made a Motion to Dismiss, because of
Lack of Prosecution (R. :24-:25). which was heard before
Judge Stewart .JI. Hanson and denied. (R. 23)
Respondents filed ~iotion to Dis1niss with Prejudice under Rule ..J:l(b). (R. 26)
Before hearing of Respondents' ~lotion to Dismiss,
AppPllant~ filed a ~lotion to Enter Order in Accordance
with Mandate for Entry of \fritten Judgn1ent. (R. 28,
29)
2
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Both motions were heard before Judge Hanson and
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss was granted. (R. 42)
Appellant's motion denied. (R. 42)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal frmn an Order and Judgment of
the Trial Court dismissing action with prejudice. The
facts of the cause leading up to the dismissal are as
follows:
Appellant brought suit to quiet title to certain real
property located in the mountains above the block "U,"
east of Salt Lake City. The original case was tried
before Judge Baker, who quieted Appellant's title and
refused rein1bursement because the property was mining property and was inadvertently assessed by the
County Assessor.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, case
No. 7134, where it was reversed with directions that the
Respondents be reimbursed in accordance with Utah
cases, cited in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The
Decision was filed September 16, 1949. (Record 2-7)
After the re1nand and jurisdiction of the cause had
revested in the Trial Court the following proceedings
were had before the Trial Court.
APPLICATION FOR ~J lrDo:M:ENT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COUR'l,
_On June 5, 1950 Appellant served a Notice of Application for Judgment in Accordance with the Mandate

3
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of the Supreme Court which was heard on June 17, 1950,
before Judge Baker. Apparently Appellant did not care
to have the property assessed by the State Tax Commission, Appellant having had from September 16, 1949,
to June 5, 1950, within which to have the State Tax Commission make the assessment, which would have established the amount of taxes. (R. 13-14) The Court
determined the amount of reimbursement to be paid
(R. 18-1.9) as follows:
"MR. GATRELL: Well, I take it the order
then is that we should reimburse him to the extent
of $235.74 in acquiring the tax deed; $35.69 taxes
for 1943; $37.06 taxes for 1944: $46.48 taxes for
1945; $46.43 taxes for 1946, making a total of
$401.40, that we should be required to do that as
a condition to having our decree quieted.
"MR. ROBBIXS : Your Honor, I think it
would be with interest, just like the calculation
is made.
"THE COURT: vVith interest, yes.
"MR. GATTRELL: Now. Your Honor has
concluded - now, to enlarge on the mandate of
the Supreine Court "THE COl~R1,: I have not concluded to enlarge on it. I mn n1erely eonceding that to be
what the 1nandate of the Supre1ne Court is.''
Appellant's counsel was apparently angry as shown
hy ti1P re1narks lw utade. (R. 17. line 3 and line :25)
After the decision of Judge Baker. Appellant took
no action to reduce tT udge Baker's decision to a written
4
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Judgn1ent. The Appellant did take further proceedings
in the matter as is hereinafter particularly stated. But
Respondents respectfully submit that the proceedings
Appellant did take, demonstrate that their only point
and purpose was to avoid the Supreme Court's decision
providing that Respondent must be reimbursed his taxes,
to avoid Judge Baker's decision thereon, and to obtain
another decision on the question of reimbursement by
another Judge.
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND INTERMEDIATE APPEAL
Appellant filed a l\1:otion for Dismissal Without
Prejudice. (R. 21) The ~1:otion was served August 8,
1953, heard September 18, 1953 (R. 9), which motion
was denied by Judge Jeppson. (R. 11) An intermediate appeal was taken from Judge Jeppson's decision
which is not in the transcript, but which was designated
by Respondent (R. 52) and is part of the records of the
case and referred to in Respondents' Affidavit (R. 33).
The case is No. 8113 in the records of the Supreme Court
of Utah. In Appellant's application for an Intern1ediate
Appeal Appellant's counsel re-argued the original appeal
endeavoring to have the Supreme Court reverse itself,
and complained about Judge Baker'~ determination of
the amount due Respondents, and his interpretation of
the Mandate of the Supreme Court. Appellant attempted
to avoid the effect of both decisions and desired to start
"all over anew" before another court. The intermediate
appeal was denied by the Supreme Court.

5
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APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK
OF PROSECUTION AND MOTION FOR DECREE
QUIETING TITLE PURSUANT TO OPINION OF
SUPREME COURT
On May 6, 1958, Appellant served a "Motion to
Dismiss the -Gause for Lack of Prosecution and Motion
for Decree Quieting Title Pursuant to the Opinion of
the Supreme Court." No reimbursement was offered
or tendered. (R. 24-25). The :h1:otion was denied on
June 2, 1958, by Judge Stewart M. Hanson. (R. 23)
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
WITH PREJUDICE
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice was
served July 21, 1958. (R. 26-27) Respondents' Affidavit
in support of their Motion to Dismiss (R. 32-33-34; Exhibits attached; R. 35 to 38) was mailed July 25, 1958.
This litigation had been pending since September 9,
1946, approximately twelve years. (R. 33) By computing the period covered by the delinquent taxes which
were paid by the Respondents to purchase the tax title
and the subsequent taxes which have been paid by the
Respondents since receiving the tax deed a twenty-year
period is covered. ( R. 33)
The 1\tiotion was based upon all of the files and records of the Cause and the affidavit of Golden W. Robbins. (R. 26) The affidavit rerites the proc~edings of
Appellant. 'rhat the Appellant had not tried to terulinate the proceedings, and disregarded the Court's
6
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Judgment and Order, causing Respondents expense and
necessity of employing counsel. That Appellant's acts
and conduct were done with the design and purpose of
delay. (R. ·33) That Respondents had been under the
stress and strain of a lawsuit for over 12 years (R. 2-7),
during which time property values had increased (R. 33)
and respondent has paid all the taxes. (R. 33)
The original officers of Appellant's Corporation
deliberately let the property go to tax sale, they did not
think the land worth paying the taxes. Attorney Junius
Romney, one of the former officers who was handling
the affairs of the Crystal Lime and Cement Company,
so testified in the original case. (R. 33)
At no time has Appellant attempted to terminate
the litigation, but the Appellant has annoyed and molested Respondents by its various motions and its disregarding of the court's judgment and order. By its
dilatory tactics. Appellant has caused the Respondents
expense and the necessity of employing council (R. 33)
all under the pressure of a lawsuit.
No counter affidavits or evidence was introduced
by Appellant at any of the hearings.
Upon the files and records of this case and the
affidavit of Respondents, the case was dismissed on
the 15th day of August, 1958, by Judge Stewart M.
Hanson. ( R. 42)
After the filing of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss
with Prejudice the Appellant filed a "Motion to Enter

7
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Order in Accordance with Mandate or for Entry of
Written Judgment" (R. 28-29), which was heard on the
same day the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss was heard.
This motion was denied by Judge Hanson. (R. 42)
The appeal is from the order of Judge Hanson of
August 15, 1958, dismissing the action with prejudice
and denying Appellant's motion.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THIS CASE UNDER RULE 41(b) AND THERE
WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Respondents herein set out Rule 41 (b) and will
discuss it and the cases which construe Rule 41 (b) and
thereafter will answer the arguments of the Appellant.
UTAH RULES OF CIYIL PROCEDURE 41(b)
"INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL. EFFECT
THEREOF. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an acti on or of any clairn against him. • • • •
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision
and any dismissal not provided for in this rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
1

Pursuant to this rule, the Trial Court distnissed
the action, and if there is no abuse of discretion by the
Trial Court, the Judgtnent n1ust be affirtned.

8
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Boling v. U. 8., C. A. Cal. 1956, 231 F. 2d 926.
"An order of dismissal for failure to prosecute will never be set aside unless there has been
an abuse of discretion, and such abuse is not to
be presumed."
Also see 5 A. C. J. 8. Sec. 1584, page 38:
"The complaining party has the burden of
showing that the Trial Court abused its discretions. Such abuse will not be presumed, but it
will be presumed that the discretion was properly
exercised."
Appellant has for the most part avoided this issue.
Appellant does recognize the rule on page 15 of its
Brief citing the case of Cameron v. Cameron, 242 P. 2d
408, and we quote from page 15, next to last paragraph,
of Appellant's Brief:
"It is recognized, of course, that a dismissal
for want of prosecution will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.''
It is the duty of a plaintiff to prosecute his case
with diligence, and a dismissal for failure to do so will
not be disturbed except for a gross abuse of discretion.

Sweeney v. Anderson, 129 F. 2d 756:
"The duty rests upon the plaintiff to use
diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination. The decisions of a trial court in
dismissing a cause for lack of prosecution will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is made to
appear that there has been a gross abuse of
discretion."
9
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New Calif. Digest, M cKimney, Vol. 9, Section 41,
Duty to Prosecute Case with Diligence, page 371.
"(j) It is the duty of plaintiff at every
stage of the proceedings to use due diligence to
expedite his case to a final termination. Craghill vs. Ford (1932), 127 Cal. 661, 16 P. 2d 343;
Lief vs. Lager (1935), 9 CA 2d 324, 49 P. 2d 886 ;
Inderbitzen vs. Lane Hospital (1936), 17 CA 2d
103, 161 P. 2d 514; Jackson vs. Debenedetti,
(1940) 39 CA 2d 574, 103 P. 2d 990."

Hvcks vs. Bekt"n Moving & Storage Co., 115 F. 2nd
406, at page 409, bottom of 1st column:
"The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every
stage of the proceedings to use diligence and to
expedite his case to final determination, and unless it is made to appear that there has been a
gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in dismissing an action for lack of prosecution its decision will not be disturbed on appeal."
As stated, the Motion to Dismiss was made under
and by virtue of Rule 4l(b).
This rule is identical with Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. \Y e know of no "Gtah case
which has been decided under the Utah rules pertaining
to failure to prosecute: there are, however, nu1nerous
cases under the Federal Rules. Respondents have been
unable to find a ca8e where a plaintiff has been so flagrant in deliberately delaying emuplianee with a Court's
Order aR in the in~tant ease in its failure to prosecute
the action. r:rhe Supreme Court'~ decision requiring
Appellant to rei1nburse Respondent for taxes paid with

10
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interest was entered on September 16, 1949. Thus, for
some eight years Appellant has deliberately failed to
comply with the Court's Order. And more - the Appellant has three times attempted to circumvent the
mandate of the Supreme Court. Thus, Appellant has
treated the mandate of the Court and the duty to prosecute the· action as something within its wish and whim,
something Appellant could do when and if payment of
the taxes and interest would appear to the Appellant
to be a good investment.

Edmond v. Moore-McOormack Lines, Inc., CA. NY.
1958, 253 F. 2d 143.
"Involuntary dismissal of a suit under the
Jones Act, section 688 of Title 46, with prejudice
for want of prosecution was discretionary where
the district court might reasonably have concluded
that the plaintiff's default of appearance was not
caused hy illness as alleged, but was an unduly
belated maneuver to obtain yet another postponenwnt after many previous postponements.
"Whether failure to prosecute a suit was
such as to warrant an involuntary dismissal under subdivision (b) of this rule was qttestion lying
within the discretion of the distri'ct court/' (Emphasis supplied.)
Barger v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 1942, 130 F. 2nd
401, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 367.

uThe pttrpose of this rule authorizing di'Smissal of an action for failure to prosecute on
motion of defendant i's to prevent unnecessary
harassment and delay in l~tigation ."
"Where after equity suit was disinissed in
federal court in Pennsylvania, plaintiff brought
11
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suit on the same claim in District of Columbia
and complaint was twice stricken from files and
with cause pending plaintiff brought another
suit and same process was repeated and with
two suits pending plaintiff brought another suit
thus having at one time three separate suits
based on same claim against same defendant,
suit was properly dismissed either under this rule
authorizing dismissal of action for failure to
prosecute on motion of defendant, or under inherent power of court to dismiss for failure to
prosecute or want of diligence." (Emphasis supplied.)
Also see the following cases:
Stern v. Inter-Mountain Te. Co~, C. A. Tenn.1955,
226 F. 2d 409.

Vaughan v. City Bank & Trust Co., Natchez, Miss.
C.A. Miss. 1955, 218 F. 2d 802, certiorari
denied, 76 S.Ct. 67, 350 r.s. 832, 100 L.Ed., 743.
De Filippis v. Chrysler Sales Corporation, C.C.A.
N.Y. 1940, 116 F. 2d 375.
Fisher v. Dover S. S. Co., C.A. N.Y. 1955, 218
F. 2d 682.
Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy. D. C. ~- Y. 195~, 18
F.R.D. ±1.
llfessenger 1.:. C. S .. C.A. X.Y. 1956, 231 F. 2d
328.
Salmon u. City of Stuart. Fla. C.A. Fla. 1952,
19-l- F. 2d 100±.
Reynold.-.· v. Tral)(U·. h R. Co .. C.~-\.. ~Io. 1956, 236
F. 2d 387.
Rolin.fJ l'. C. S .. C.A. Cal. 1956, 231 F. 2d 926.
Russell v. Cunninglwm. C. A. Gua1n 1956, 233
F. 2nd 806.
12
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The Appellant, after Respondent's 1\iotion to Dismiss, filed a Motion to Enter an Order in Accordance
with the Mandate or for Entry of Written Judgment.
Even at that late date, Appellant did not make a tender
of any uwney. Even if Appellant had done so, it would
have been too late. Activity by a plaintiff after a
Motion to Dismiss has been rnade comes too late. The
following cases so hold:
Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., C. C. A.
Wash. 1940, 115 F. 2d 406.

·'An order of dismissal may be granted notwithstanding plaintiff has been stirred into action
by impending dismissal, since subsequent diligence is no excuse for past negligence."
See also, U. 8. v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co.,
C.C.A. Wash. 1943, 138 F. 2d 367.
Holtzoff 1/. Dodge & Olcott co., 134 App. Div. 353,
119 N.Y.S. 47.

"iv[oreover, an order of dismissal may be
granted, notwithstanding the plaintiff has been
stirred into action by the impending dismissal,
for subsequent diligence is no excuse for past negligence."
ANSWERING APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS
Point I, I(a)
Appellant, at page 6 of its Brief, reduces the five
grounds of Respondent':::; l\1 otion to Dismiss into but
two grounds. (R. 26) Should any one of the five grounds

13
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of the Motion be found good, then the decision of Judge
Hanson to dismiss must be affirmed.
5 C.J.S., Sec. 1464, page 651:

"As a general rule, the Appellant court may
affirm the judgment where it is correct on anv
legal ground or theory disclosed by the record,
regardless of the ground, reason or theory
adopted by the Trial Court."
4 Cal. Jur. 2d, Sec. 563, page 432:

"Where the record does not show on which
grounds on which a ruling is made, it must be
presumed to have been upon some good ground.
Thus, where an order granting a motion to vacate a judgment is general in terms and can be
sustained on any ground stated in the motion, an
appellate court is bound to assume that it was
granted on that ground."
. Appellant, on page 6 of its Brief, states that there
has been no adjudication of the rights of the parties
since the Supreme Court's decision. This is not a correct statement. There was an adjudication of the rights
of the parties. Judge Baker specifically ruled as to the
rights of the parties construing the 1nandate of the
Supreme Court. The only basis for the incorrect statement of the Appellant is that there is no written final
Judgment. But Judge Baker did 1nake a decision and
it only remained for ~\ppellant to put it in formal form
for ~ignature, hereafter we quote that which actually
took place.
14
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The Appellant, on page 7 of its Brief, in discussing
the hearing before Judge Baker, states that it tendered
$236.00 based upon Appellant's interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision. Appellant failed to state that
which actually happened at the hearing, but simply sets
out the minute entry. The actual proceedings which
occurred at the hearing pertaining to the tender and
the amount of taxes to be reimbursed are as follows:
(R. 16 Line 20) to (R. 18 Line 25)
"MR. GATRELL: Now, that being the case
I will not ask the Court to go behind-to go over
the mandate of the Supreme Court, and if I
should, I don't think the Court would accommodate me by requiring me to pay only the amount
that I would be required to pay upon a valid
assessment of the State Tax Commission, therefore, I believe, it up to the Court to require us,
under the Court's ruling, to pay to Mr. Robbins
the sum of $235.74, which was the amount which
he expended in acquiring that tax title.
"MR. ROBBINS: And in addition thereto
to pay me the amount of the taxes which paid for
the years 1943, '44, '45 and '46 together with
interest on them.
"MR. GATRELL: Oh no, no-the Supreme
Court did not so say. The Supreme Court (it
is sort of a Bishop's ·Court decision) said reimburse him the amount in acquiring tax title of
$235.74.
At this time I tender Mr. Robbins the sum
of $236.00 and will not even require any change
from him.
Will you accept that tender, $236~00 ~

15
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MR. ROBBINS: No. I am now willing to
accept $235.74 calculated with six per cent-whatever it is-and then I will hold myself if the
State Tax Commission ever requires you to
reasses it.
In this case they set out, citing the Hallick
case, mentions interest and further sums in
equity, what the Court's require them to do, require them to pay the amount of Inoney expended
for taxes plus interest.
MR. GATRELL : This is a very remarkable
case in that the Court requires reimbursement
of a payment made on tax that was void, not
by reason of any irregularity, not by reason of
any defect in the description, but by reason of
the fact that the body making the assessment was
absolutely without jurisdiction to make assessment, and therefore the mandate of the Court is
simple, we should be required to reimburse him
in the amount he paid in acquiring this ground.
It is somewhat like a Bishop's court decision~
and the authorities cited by the dissenting judges
hold that where there is no valid assessment and
where the assessment is void by reason of a purported assessment 1nade by one having no authority to make it, that assessn1ents are absolutely
void and no one can make it. and perhaps for
that reason the Court frruned it like it did.
I have not asked the Court to disobey the
1nandate of the Court, neither do I ask the Court
to Inake an order which the Suprmne Court did
not ask for. The Supre1ne Court did not require
payment of any subsequent taxes, but only the
anwunt"THE COURT: \Yhereabouts did you find
the justification for the latter part?
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"MR. GATRELL : This is in the op1n1on,
it says here if Your Honor please, this is on page
2 reads)
(Argument by Counsel)
"THE COURT: I conceive the mandate of
the Supreme Court to be the repayment to Mr.
Robbins of all the taxes due and paid by him
under that assessment, including the taxes for
1943, '4, '5, '6, and so on. I think that is essentially
the mandate of the Supreme Court.
"MR. ROBBINS : I think so too.
"THE COURT: And I suppose that the
matter is therefore disrnissed at this time?
"MR. GATRELL: Well, I take it the order
then is that we should reimburse him to the
extent of $235.74 in acquiring the tax deed; $35.69
taxes for 1943; $37.06 taxes for 1944; $46.48 taxes
for 1945; $46.43 taxes for 1946, making a total
of $401.40, that we should be required to do that
as a condition to having our decree quieted.
"MR. ROBBINS: Your Honor, I think it
would be with interest, just like the calculation
is made.
"THE COURT:

With interest, yes.

"MR. GATRELL: Now, Your Honor has
concluded-now, to enlarge on the mandate of
the Supreme Court"THE COURT: I have not concluded to enlarge on it. I am merely conceding that to be
what the mandate of the Supreme Court is."
After the decision of .Judge Baker, Appellant did
nothing but attempt to circumvent the decision of the
Supreme Court and Judge Baker's ruling.
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Appellant requested Judge Jeppson to dismiss the
case without prejudice, succeeding in which Appellant
expected to be in position to start all over again and
avoid the decision of the Supreme Court, and avoid
the ruling of Judge Baker. From the ruling of Judge
Jeppson, Appellant took an intermediate appeal and
in its motion argued the original case over again. This
makes it clearly evident that Appellant did not intend
to comply with the Supreme Court's decision, or Judge
Baker's ruling but deliberately avoided same.
Appellant's next attempt, through its new attorneys,
was to file a Motion wihch was heard before Judge
Hanson asking for a judgment quieting title, but dismissing the case as to the payment of the taxes. This
was another attempt to avoid the decision of the Supreme Court and the ruling of Judge Baker. and to have
the title quieted without con1plying with the ruling and
without paying any money or doing equity.
Appellant, on page 8 states that without a final
judgment there is no final decision of the Court. .Appellant uses the word ••final" to denote an erroneous
meaning. There was a decision. True, only a minute
entry was 1nade, not a written judg1nent. What was the
next step which should have been taken and by whom?
After the hearing before Judge Baker. the runount of
taxes to be reirnbursed wa8 clearly detern1ined. Certainly Respondents should not be required to draw a
decree quieting- titlP in the Appellant. The contention
of Appellant 8how~ how wrong it i8. Even if Respondents
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had drawn Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, the
Court might have signed the same, but the ·Court could
not have forced the Appellant to pay the money, and
there could be no decree. See the case of Toronto vs.
Sheffield 118 Utah 460, 222 P. 2d 594, the Court discussed the inequitable ruling which had been made by
the Utah Supreme Court in protecting the owners of
property, the Court Speaking through Judge Wolfe on
page 603 said :
"But if the defendant did not pay, the finding
would repose in the records of the clerk's office
but there would be no decree."
There would not be a thing that Respondents could
have done about it except to proceed as Respondents
have done here.
Respondents have no quarrel with the cases cited
by the Appellant on pages 8 and 9 of its Brief, holding
that there is only an appeal from a final Judgment.
These cases are not in point and do not pertain to nor are
they applicable to the instant case. This appeal is not
an appeal from Judge Baker's minute entry.
An oral order of the Court is not smnething which
is to be taken lightly. In the case of Forman v. Forman
111 Utah 72, 176 P. 2d 144 the Court held Plaintiff in contempt of Court for failure to cornply with the oral
order of Court, and this case was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
On pages 9 and 10 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant
erroneously asserts that there was no detenninati.on
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made and qualifies it by the words "final ajudication"
and then Appellant complains that it has lost its right~
by the dismissal. These rights were lost because Ap·
pellant did not prosecute the action with diligence, because Appellant tried to avoid the ruling of the Supreme
Court and the decisions of Judge Baker in determining
the taxes to be paid, by Appellant seeking a dismissal
by Judge Jeppson, by Appellant's failure to pay the
1noney, by filing a motion before Judge Hanson .at-:
tempting to have a Judgment entered without paying
any taxes.
Attention is called to the fact that Rule 41 (b) says
for failure of plaintiff (appellant), not defendant (respondent), to prosecute or to comply with these rules
or an;y order of Court.
In the last paragraph on page 9 and the top of page
10, Appellant again argues there was no final decision
and that the Court"s dismissal has prevented the A:p.;
pellant fr01n having the matters reviewed, either by
hearing or by an appeal from the Judgment of the Trial
Court, which did not carry out its mandate. This is not
correct. Appellant did have a hearing on the mandate,
but Appellant was not satisfied with the decision. It
was not until eight year~ later that the Court disn1issed
the case for lack of prosecution.
Appellant, on pag(' 10 of it~ Brief. quotes from th~
Supren1e Court'~ deei~ion in this ea~e and complains
that it was deprived of the right to have the taxes deterinined and to have the proceedings tenninated. Ap"'
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pellant had its taxes determined, and Appellant could
have terminated the proceedings at that time, had it
not hoped to get the property without paying any taxes.
On page 10 and top of page 11 of Appellant's Brief,
Appellant complains that it tried to comply with the
mandate by having the hearing before Judge Baker,
that it got no relief. Appellant did get relief, but not
the relief it hoped for and thereafter endeavored to
avoid Judge Baker's decision . .Certainly Judge Baker's
determination of the amount of reimbursement should
have precluded Appellant from seeking a different determination from any other District Judge. When Appellant disliked Judge Baker's ruling, it should have
then entered its Judgment and appealed to the Supreme
Court. Not having done so and having waited eight
years, the case was properly dismissed. It is difficult
to see how Appellant can blarne the Court, contending
the Court prevented Appellant from obtaining relief,
when Appellant had a clear remedy at all times.
At pages 11, 12, 13 and 14 of Appellant's Brief,
Appellant cites cases holding that the Trial Court must
comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court. We, of
course, do not disagree with the rule of law. That is
exactly what Judge Baker did in the instant case at
(R-18 line 12-16) wherein Judge Baker says:
"THE COURT: I conceive the Mandate of
the Supreme Court to be the repayment to Mr.
Robbins of all the taxes due and paid by him
under that assessment, including the taxes for
1943, '4, '5, '6, and so on. I thing that is essentially
the mandate of the Supreme Court."
21
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chaser in the case of Shipp vs. Sheffild, 101 Utah 54,
117 P. 2d 996, wherein the subsequent taxes were not
paid and the land went to sale the second time for taxes
and the tax title purchaser's rights were extinguished.
Undoubtedly, the Appellant was hoping to invoke the
law of that case. Respondents, however, continued to
pay the taxes. Most certainly the paying of money is
prejudicial when paid at a time when the value of the
property is questionable. Certainly the having of a lawsuit dangling over ones head is not pleasant, it is prejudicial, as is also the necessity of retaining counsel to
represent Respondents in the various maneuvers of
Appellant to avoid complying with the Court's decisions.
The refusal to pay the taxes was deliberate. The
former officer of Appellant corporation did not think
it was worth the money. Respondents have much more
in the property than the Appellant.
It was not until after the ~lotion to Dismiss was
filed by Respondents that there was any indication that
the Appellant would pay the taxes and even at that
late date there was never a tender of money.
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion m
dismissing the case. Had the court not dis1nissed the case,
it would have been an abuse of discretion. Respondents
submit: If Rule ±l(b) has any Ineaning, it should be
applied in this case.
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POINT (b)
We will now answer Point (b) found on page 15 of
Appellant's Brief that:
"The Court Errored In Holding That The
Case Had Not Been Prosecuted With Diligence,
And Has Thus Resulted In Prejudice To The
Defendant."
Appellant admits, citing Cameron v. Cameron,
Supra, that there must be a clear Abuse of Discretion by
the trial Judge or the case cannot be reversed, with which
we agree. Appellant sets out a list of the steps taken by
the plaintiff commencing in 1950. For a full enumeration of these steps, we respectively refer the Court to
our statement of the facts and submit there was no
diligent prosecution of the case, but an attempt to evade
the Court's decisions. From the brief summation of the
facts, Appellant argues it has always attempted to have
the correct amount determined. We submit that this is
not a correct statement as revealed by the record. Appellant's only attempt to have the amount of the taxes
determined prior to the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss,
was by Judge Baker, and when that decision did not
suit Appellant, it started on a series of manuevers designed to avoid payment of taxes as we have heretofore
pointed out. Then Appellant discusses whether or not
there was an Abuse of Discretion by Judge Hanson when
he dismissed the case and relies upon the case of WriJght
v. Howell 150 P. 956 46 Utah 588. Respondents submit
that even if this case were In point, it should not be
25
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controlling because the case was decided prior to the
promulgation of Rule 41 (b).
The Supreme Court when adopting Rule 41 (b), we
presume, intended that the Trial Court would use 'it to
see that a plaintiff prosecuted his case with diligence,
either before or after an appeal, and if he did not, then
it could be dismissed upon motion of the defendant.
But further, the Wright v. Howell case is distinguishable fr01n the instant case. There were three years of delay, not eight. Nor is it a case where the Appellant tried
to avoid the decision of the Courts after the amount of
reimbursement had been determined by going to another
District Judge for dismissal without prejudice, and for a
Judgment Quieting Title without reimbursement, and attempting to avoid the Supreme Court's decision by not
reimbursing the Respondents. Further, in Wright t:.
How ell the Appellate Court did not disturb the Trial
Court's discretions. It affirmed the Trial Court's denml
of defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
The other cases cited in the Brief on page 17 and 18
are not Utah cases. They are cases which were not
decided under a statute or a rule similar to our Rule
41 (b), and are also distinguishable upon the facts, as
for example, construed a different statute, or negotiations had been carried on by the parties, and other distinctions which, will be apparent to this court.
The cases Respondents eite on pages 11. 12, 13 of this
Brief, all construe Rule -U (b) of the Federal Rules.
None of the eases cited by the Appellant discuss Rule
41(b) and we sub1nit, none of then1 are in point.
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POINTS II, III, IV, AND V
Respondents will answer points II, III, IV, and V
together. These assignments in substance complain that
because the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment were not entered after remand of the cause.
The Findings and Decree should have been entered eight
years ago, and it is too late after a motion is made to
Dismiss with Prejudice. It would be inequitable to allow
Appellant to have Findings and Decree entered now
after it has attempted to avoid entering the same, and
to avoid the ruling of the courts for eight years, during
which time the Respondents have had to pay the taxes
and have been otherwise prejudiced as heretofore set out.
Now that the case has been terminated because of
their actions and dilatory tactics, Appellants bitterly
complain. It says that the Trial Court does not have
jurisdiction to dismiss. After the remittitur the case
was returned to the Trial Court for proceedings not
inconsistent with the decision. The trial court however
has the right to take into consideration any subsequent
facts and subsequent acts and the conduct of the parties.
We submit that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to dismiss on the facts in this record and there was no abuse
of discretion.
Respondents have heretofore answered all of Appellant's arguments that could apply to these points,
and Respondents respectfully submit that it is proper
that this litigation be brought to a close by affirmance
of the trial court.
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SUMMARY
The Supreme Court ruled that title could be quieted
only provided Appellant reirnbursed the Respondents.
The amount was determined by Judge Baker, Appellant
endeavored to modify the decision rendered b~T Judge
Baker. When Appellant was unsuccessful, it let the
matter rest. Then in the hope of avoiding the Supreme
Court's decision and Judge Baker's decision, Appellant
asked Judge Jeppson to Dismiss Without Prejudice,
which he denied. It tried an intermediate appeal from
that decision, re-arguing the original case in its petition
for an intermediate appeal. Appellant made another motion, trying to avoid the effect of the Supreme Court's
decision and Judge Baker's ruling by asking Judge
Hanson to enter a judgment quieting title but with no
reimbursement which Judge Hanson denied.
The Respondents' ~Iotion to Disrniss \Yith Prejudice
was granted by the District Court, and Appellant's subsequent l\f otion to Enter tT udgment was properly denied.
If there \\·as ever a ease where a Trial Court was
entitled to exercise discretion and disrniss a case under
Rule 41 (b) it is this easP. and if Rule -11 (b) is to have
any effect, Respondents respectfully subrnit that the decision of Judge Hanson should be affinned. Certainly
there was no abuse of diseretion; in faet. respondents
subrnit there would have been abuse of discretion had
the Trial Court denied Hespondents' ~I otion to Dismiss.
Rm;pondents respectfully subn1it that the Judgment
of the Trial ( \m rt should be affinned.
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Respectfully submitted,
Milton B. Backman
Williarn H. Henderson
Golden W. Robbins

Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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